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has been argued that such an approach
treats culture monolithically as singularly
shaping 'action by supplying ultimate ends
or values to "Wards "Which action is directed'
(S"Widler 1986: 273). This perspective is to
be compared "With the concept of value in
classical econotnics of Adalll Smith and
David Ricardo, "Where the concept concerns a set of relationships that obtain
"Within a systelll in the form of commodity
prices or exchange values. As SIllith puts it:
'The value of any commodity ... is equal
to the quantity of labour "Which it enables
hilll to purchase- or cOlllmand. Labour ... is
the real llleasure of the -exchangeable value
of all cOIlllllodities' (Smith 1976: 47).
Here, value is not an ultiIllate end to"Wards
"Which action is directed, but rather the
effect of action involved in the "Work
required to extract objects of consulllption
frOIll nature.
Emile Durkheim criticized SIllith's classical value theory explanation in terIllS of
labour input by arguing that it missed the
central dimension of the concept of value.
Value understood in terlllS of labour content appears as if it "Were sOIllething entirely
objective and impersonal. But Durkheilll
argued that such a conception overlooks
the role of social opinion in determining
value, particularly in determining notions
of just value (Durkheim 1992). This sallle
critique, it should be noted, can be extended to neoclassical value theory in that it
also treats value as lllarket price, though

Value generally refers to the aIllount of
Illoney or other goods that lllust be paid to
obtain sOlllething. There are nonetheless a
nUIllber of very different value concepts,
and in particular there is considerable difference betw"een the "Ways in "Which econotnic sociology and orthodox econolllics
treat the concept of value. In contrast,
betw"een econolllic sociology and heterodox econotnics there are significant COllllllonalities regarding the treatlllent of the
concept of value. The differences date back
to the origins of sociology and classical
econotnics, and persist or have perhaps
become sharper betw"een contelllporary economic sociology and neoclassical econOlllics. The commonalities betw"een economic
sociology and heterodox economics have
eIllerged particularly since the 1 980s.
In the history of sociology, value has
been treated as a property of entire social
systellls, such as "When it is associated "With
the concept of culture by Max Weber, one
of the early founciers of sociology: The
concept of culture is a value concept.
Empirical reality becomes 'culture' to us
because and insofar as "We relate it to value
ideas (Weber 1949: 76).
On this vie"W, our interest in reality is a
function of the values "Which culture
eIllbodies, that is, our interest in the "World
is a 'value-conditioned' one. SOllletiIlles
termed the 'values approach to culture', it
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rather as detennined by objective and
impersonal forces of supply and demand.
Durkheim's argument vvas framed primarily
in terms of the value of labour, and vvhile it
might be applied to the value of consumer
and other types of goods, he focused on
arguing that the vvage rate depends upon
social standards regarding the minimum
resources needed to sustain to survival, that
these standards vvere set by public opinion,
and that they changed from period to period. HOVlTever, Smith, David Ricardo and
even more strongly Karl Marx each held in
varying degrees similar vievvs regarding the
social determination of the vvage. And since
for each of them the value of other commodities depended upon the value of
labour, this implies that their values also
possessed a social component.
Durkheim's critique, hOVlTever, is more
successful in regard to the neoclassical vievv
of the VlTage as determined by the marginal
productivity of labour in production and in
regard to the neoclassical vievv of price in
general as market-determined. The marginal productivity of labour is a schedule of
outputs made possible by incremental
increases in labour input. Its level reflects
the quantity of capital employed by labour,
VlThere both labour input and the capital
employed are described in natural units:
hours of labour and a certain quantity of
machines and equipment. While one might
say that social standards and public opinion
implicitly underlie these values, rarely do
these considerations enter into standard
analysis. Much the same can be said about
the explanation of price in general in neoclassical economics .. Consumers play an
important role in determining market price,
but consumer preferences are taken as
given and unchanging (Stigler and Becker
1977), so that their social determinants may
be
disregarded.
Even more strongly,
revealed preference price theory (Samuelson 1948), vvhich most mainstream economists novv take as the standard explanation
of choice, makes the very content of pre702

ferences irrelevant to consumer choice.
More generally, the formalist character of
ITluch recent economics reinforces the
notion that value as price lacks any social
characteristics VlThatsoever.
In contrast, heterodox traditions in economics, particularly AITlerican institutional
economics and social economics, hold
vievvs of value reminiscent of Weber's vievv
that value is a property of entire social systems and Durkheim's conception of market
values as socially influenced. American
institutional economists Thorstein Veblen,
John Commons, John Maurice Clark and
others make central institutions seen as
'settled habits of thought common to the
generality of men' (Veblen 1919: 239).
Social economics, vvith origins in Simonde
de Sismondi, Karl Marx, Leon Walras,
Joseph Schumpeter, John Hobson and
John Maurice Clark, see the social economy as encompassing the market economy,
so that social values and vvorldvievvs
permeate markets and underlie consumption, production and distribution. Other
heterodox approaches, such as Marxist
economics, feminist economics, some ecological economics approaches and post-_
Keynesian economics, are similarly holistic,
historically oriented, critical of the naturalism and positivism in economics, and
reject the atomistic individualism of neoclassical economics. The last is a key point
of tangency betvveen heterodox economics
and economic sociology and a key difference betvveen orthodox economics and
economic sociology. Just as Georg Simmel,
in his important early study The Philosophy
of Money (1978), identified related types of
individuals (such as the spendthrift and the
miser) according to their linked positions in
an economic system governed by money,
radical and Marxist economists see individuals as socially connected through their
ITleITlbership in classes and social groups
• of pOVlTer, vvhile
that interact vvithin systems
feminist economists see gender relationships in the economy as constitutive of
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individuals' econonuc roles and econonuc
prospects.
Interestingly, economic sociology enjoyed
a revival in the 1980s, a period in "Which
heterodox economics "Was also undergoing
considerable development. While crossover
relationships bet"Ween the t"Wo have been
limited, they have nonetheless appear to
have each follo"Wed certain parallel path"Ways that may be seen to derive from a
shared critique of the assumptions of neoclassical economics. Even more interestingly, economic sociology and heterodox
economics appear to share broad outlines of
a vie"W of individuals as socially embedded
fa Karl Polanyi, and of individuals and
society as mutually influencing. Thus,
parallel to economic sociologist Mark
Granovetter's influential characterization
of individuals' embeddedness in terms of
being neither undersocialized nor oversocialized (Granovetter 1985), there is critical realisITl, a recent heterodox research
programme combining a number of different heterodox approaches, that employs a
structure-agent conception of society in
"Which individuals both influence and are
influenced by social structures (La"Wson
1997), and also a rene"Wed interest in the
evolutionary themes of Veblenian institutional economics, that emphasizes up"Ward
and do"Wn"Ward causation operating bet"Ween
individuals and institutions (Hodgson 2004).
The 1980s also signal the beginnings of
change in mainstream economics, "With the
emergence of a collection of ne"W research
programmes that bear limited resemblance
to neoclassical economics and each other.
These ne""W research programITles have
almost all originated outside economics,
thus not only importing modes of thinking
often quite far removed from the traditional
assumptions of neoclassical economics, but
also reversing a period of economic
imperialism "When the individual rationality
assumptions of neoclassical economics "Were
re-applied outside of economics. Game
theory comes from mathematics, and chal-
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lenges the notion that economic individuals
are isolated from one another by examining
their interaction in games. In place of
value as market price, value in game theory is understood in terms of sets of alternative payoffs "Which depend upon ho""W
players anticipate each other's choices. Noncooperative, one-shot games bear many of
the features of the neoclassical economic
view of the individual, but repeated games
and cooperative games introduce a variety
of considerations regarding play that make
social structure central. Another ne""W
research programme, behavioural economics, ""With origins in psychology, has focused
on re-examination of neoclassical rational
choice theory. Among its results, demonstrated repeatedly in experimental studies, is
that economic individuals often cooperate
rather than behave In a self-interested
manner. Additionally, individuals' decision-making appears to reflect heuristic
cognitive bias (use of rules of thumb rather
than rigorous analysis) and different kinds
of decision-framing effects associated "With
habits, 'herd mentality' and emotional
attachments. For e-xoarnple, valuation can be
influenced by strong feelings of regret
individuals have regarding the loss of specially prized goods. Yet a third ne"W research
programme,
evolutionary
economics,
including evolutionary game theory, "With
origins in Dar"Winian biology, has multiple
currents, some overlapping "With game theory and behavioural economics. Here,
investigation first focused on evolutionary
change in economic systems, and value is
modelled as the frequency-dependent fitness of different survival strategies in populations over time. Subsequent investigation
replaces this biological emphasis ""With the
idea of cultural evolution of beliefs and
norms, and value is modelled in terms of
the 'fitness' of these beliefs and norms to
promote some generally useful good. These
ne"W research programmes in mainstream
economics mayor may not converge on
the value themes that have characterized
703
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economic sociology (and heterodox economics) in the future. While sorne currents
in recent economics give prorninence to
social value concepts, others appear to be
guided more by natural science and fonnalist ideas. On the "W"hole, ho"W"ever, recent
economics is a far rnore eclectic theoretical
undertaking than neoclassical economics,
particularly as reflected in the fonner's
departures frorn the latter's linked postulates of value understood as Illarket price
and individuals understood as isolated
beings. Thus, "W"hereas there reIllain clear
differences between economic sociology and
neoclassical econorrllcs regarding the concept of value, "W"hether these differences "W"ill
persist between the fonner and econorrllcs
as it ernerges in the future remain to be seen.
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VEBLEN, THORSTEIN
Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929) "W"as a heterodox Arnerican econoIllist "W"ho laid the
intellectual foundations of American institutional economics. The son of N o r"W"e gian
iIllrrllgrants, Veblen studied at Carleton
College, John Hopkins University, Yale
University ("W"here he received a PhD in
philosophy) and Cornell University ("W"here
he did graduate "W"ork in econorrllcs). In the
course of a chequered acadeIllic career, he
held teaching positions at the University
of Chicago (1892-1906), Stanford University (1906-9), the University of Missouri
(1911-18) and'the N e.~_School for Social
Research (1918-26). Closely attuned to intel-lectual developments in a broad range of
academic disciplines and national contexts,
Veblen incorporated into his economic
"W"ritings concepts and theories frorn contemporary research in psychology, ethnology and the biological sciences, as part of a
determined effort to bring econoIllics in
step "W"ith the "W"idely respected evolutionary
sciences of his era.
Entering econoITlics "W"hen the field "W"as
ernbroiled in controversies between socalled orthodox approaches and challenges
froITl traditions such as the GerIllan historical school, Veblen sharpened and elaborated the critique of orthodox classical and
neoclassical economic theory. At the saIlle
tiITle, he upbraided exponents of the historical school for 'content[ing] theITlselves
"W"ith an enumeration of data [and failing] to

